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This paper presents a model of imperfect international competi-
tion. Within this framework, the optimal choice of national environ-
mental policy instrument and international emissions trading scheme
is discussed. The choice of national instrument is restricted to ab-
solute and relative standards, which form the basis for permit and
credit trading respectively. It is shown that relatives standards and
credit trading lead to higher output than emission ceilings and permit
trading. I ﬁnd that governments want to increase production beyond
the level reached with emission ceilings and therefore prefer relative
standards. Furthermore, international emissions trading is only opti-
mal when the country imports emission quotas, and in several cases,
governments will choose not to allow international emissions trading.
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1 Introduction
International emissions trading is becoming more of a reality after the Kyoto
Protocol allowed such trade and especially after the EU has started imple-
menting a scheme of its own. As the discussion within the EU showed, the
design of an emissions trading scheme is not straightforward and countries
have diﬀerent preferences.
One of the most important issues in the design of emissions trading is
what its basis should be. The traditional choice is a cap on emissions, which
is distributed over the emission sources in the form of permits. The initial
distribution can either be done through grandfathering where the permits are
given for free, or by auctioning them. The are some theoretical arguments
in favor of auctioning, but political reality dictates that permits are grand-
fathered, with at most a small part auctioned oﬀ to facilitate entry to the
regulated sector. This is also the outcome in the EU scheme. Another pos-
sibility is to base emissions trading on relative standards (see Boom (2001),
Gielen et al. (2002) and Boom (2003a)). In this system, ﬁrms are allowed to
emit a certain amount per unit of output (or an input) and can sell credits
if they can stay below the standard. Total emissions are not ﬁxed, but can
change with output. In the following, the scheme based on absolute emis-
sion ceilings will be denoted by permit trading, while the system based on
relative standards will be denoted as credit trading. The two schemes have a
diﬀerent impact on output and marginal abatement costs. These diﬀerences
stem from the diﬀerences in the underlying instruments. So just as relative
standards lead to higher output per ﬁrm than absolute standards, the same is
the case with credit trading versus permit trading. At the same time, credit
trading gives higher marginal abatement costs than permit trading. Because
of the diﬀerences in impacts of the two schemes, ﬁrms and governments may
have preferences for one system over the other. This issue is the main subject
of this paper.
As will be clear from the description of the two emissions trading schemes
given here, a preference for one of them is linked to a preference for the under-
lying instrument. Therefore, when analyzing the preference for international
emissions trading scheme, it is instructive to analyze the preference between
emission ceilings and relative standards too. Furthermore, when analyzing
preferences for both international trading scheme and national instrument, it
becomes possible to determine whether engaging in international emissions
trading scheme is beneﬁcial for a country.
Boom (2003b) analyzes strategic choice of emissions trading scheme for
the case of perfect international competition when countries have market
power. His ﬁndings are that the preference for emissions trading scheme3
depends on whether a country is an importer or an exporter of the good.
An exporter wants to lower domestic production, while an importer wants to
expand production. Since permit trading leads to a lower production level
than credit trading, exporting countries generally prefer permit trading, while
importers prefer credit trading. Whether or not a country wants to engage
in international emissions trading depends on whether it becomes a seller or
buyer of emission quotas. A country that sells quotas will contract domestic
production, while a buyer will expand production. Depending on which is
compatible with domestic preferences, a country may prefer to allow private
international emissions trading. However, it may also be the case that the
country prefers not to engage in international emissions trading.
With imperfect competition in the goods market, other forces come to
play. Now the ﬁrms are engaged in a strategic game where market share is an
important factor in determining proﬁts. Furthermore, imperfect competition
leads to lower output than perfect competition. If the country also consumes
the good, it may therefore have an incentive to increase production. These
factors make that preferences for both national instrument and international
emissions trading scheme may be diﬀerent with imperfect than with perfect
competition.
Other papers have discussed strategic choice of environmental policy
and instrument choice in an international setting (see next section for an
overview). However, only a few discuss relative standards and almost none
credit trading. Furthermore, when these instruments are considered, only
the case of perfect competition is discussed.
In this paper I will analyze the optimal choice of national instrument
and international emissions trading scheme by governments when there is
imperfect and international competition in the market for the output. More
precisely, I present a partial equilibrium model of a market with two ﬁrms,
producing a homogeneous good, each located in a diﬀerent country. Govern-
ments can at the national level choose between emission ceilings and relative
standards, while at the international level they can choose between permit
and credit trading and no international emissions trading.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, an overview of
related literature is given. The model is discussed in Section 3. First I will
analyze the case without international emissions trading. Here the govern-
ment can choose between emission ceilings and relative standards. It will be
shown that the government always wants to increase production above the
level reached with emission ceilings. After that, in subsection 3.2, the choice
of international emissions trading scheme is discussed. The choice between
schemes is more or less the same as that between national instruments, but
with a change in the (shadow) price of emissions. However, it is shown that in4
certain cases, especially when the country becomes a seller of emission quo-
tas, countries may prefer not to engage in international emissions trading.
Conclusions are given in section 4.
2 Overview of the literature
The literature on strategic environmental policy in models with international
trade is mostly based on two seminal articles by Spencer and Brander (1983)
Brander and Spencer (1985)) on international R&D rivalry and government
export subsidies. In the basic model Spencer and Brander (1983), R&D
leads to lower marginal production costs and thereby to higher output. In a
duopoly model ﬁrms will invest in R&D for strategic purposes. This leads to
higher investment in R&D, larger ﬁrm and total output and lower industry
proﬁt. The reason for this is that ﬁrms are caught in a Prisoner’s Dilemma
where each ﬁrm has an incentive to increase R&D to be able to commit to
higher output levels, while combined proﬁts would be higher if they would not
increase output. If governments provide subsidy for R&D, these eﬀects are
even more pronounced (Brander and Spencer (1985)). The government can
more credibly commit to a large subsidy on R&D than the ﬁrm can commit
to a large level of R&D, so that with government subsidies output is larger. If
there is domestic consumption, the subsidy can be welfare improving, since
output increases and product price decreases. Also here, ﬁrm proﬁts are
lower if neither of the ﬁrms and governments had invested strategically in
R&D.
The ﬁrst use of these models in the ﬁeld of international environmen-
tal problems was to analyze the strategic choice of level of environmental
policy. Some examples are Barrett (1994), Ulph (1994, 1996a,b, 1997) and
Rauscher (1997). The main conclusion is that governments have an incentive
to set a lower than optimal level of environmental policy when the domestic
producer of a good operates on an oligopolistic market. However, as Bar-
rett (1994), Ulph (996a) and Rauscher (1997) have pointed out, the reaction
of the government is dependent on market conduct. The above mentioned
conclusion only holds when ﬁrms compete with quantities (Cournot compe-
tition). When ﬁrms engage in price, or Bertrant, competition governments
will want to impose overly strict environmental policies.
A second use of the models by Brander and Spencer is in the modelling
of instrument choice when there is international trade. Ulph (1992) uses a
duopoly model where the two ﬁrms are located in diﬀerent countries and
the commodity is not consumed in the two countries. Production costs are
dependent on two inputs: one denoted as energy is an input that causes5
pollution, the other is a non-polluting production factor which is referred to
as capital. Ulph then considers three cases: a single stage Cournot model, a
two stage Stackelberg model and a two stage Cournot model. In the one stage
Cournot model, the ﬁrms, knowing which instrument the governments have
chosen, set their capital level and output simultaneously. It is shown that
the reaction function is steeper when a tax is imposed than when a ceiling is
imposed on the ﬁrm. This implies that a ﬁrm will react with a smaller change
in output on a given change in foreign output under ceilings than under taxes.
The conclusion from this model is that in a one shot Cournot model, countries
are indiﬀerent between ceilings and taxes. The reason for this is that in a
one-shot game there is no strategic interaction and all instruments discussed
give the same output. The choice of instrument is then a purely domestic
decision.
In the two other cases, can invest strategically in capital, thereby changing
there production capacity. The driving force behind the results that follow is
that ﬁrms will invest more in capital when they are regulated through taxes
than when they are facing emission ceilings. The second case discussed by
Ulph (1992) is a Stackelberg model. The outcome is that in the optimum,
the Stackelberg follower will prefer ceilings, while the leader is indiﬀerent
between taxes and ceilings. This outcome ensures the lowest total output
and thereby the highest industry proﬁts. The most interesting model for
our purposes is the two-stage Cournot model. In this model, the ﬁrms ﬁrst
simultaneously choose their level of capital, and thereafter simultaneously
choose their level of output and energy. In this case, the use of ceilings
by both countries is a Nash equilibrium in the choice of instruments. The
reason for this is that under taxes the ﬁrms over-invest in capital and thereby
increase production. Each country then has an incentive to shift to ceilings,
which lowers the incentive to over invest and raises proﬁts. The model used
by Ulph does not contain any speciﬁcation for consumers’ surplus, but in
general the conclusions will hold as long as the consumption of the good in
the two countries only represents a small share of world consumption.
In a more recent paper (Ulph (1996b)), Ulph generalizes the Cournot
model described above. Instead of using only two inputs, energy and capital,
a more general speciﬁcation of the cost function is given. Furthermore, the
1996 paper allows for both production and consumption in the two countries.
The more general model of technology makes that the use of emission ceilings
is no longer always the dominant strategy.
Also in Ulph (1996a) the use of ceilings induces less strategic behaviour by
the ﬁrms than does the use of taxes. However, it is now not always optimal
to use ceilings. The choice of instruments is dependent on the relative sizes
of the producer and the consumer surplus. With a relatively large producer6
surplus government prefers ceilings, while with a relative large consumer
surplus it prefers taxes.
Feenstra et al. (1996) and Feenstra (1998c) have extended the model of
Ulph (1992) to a fully dynamic analysis. In doing this they use a diﬀerential
game approach where ﬁrms use open-loop investment strategies and feedback
strategies for the choice of the polluting input. Their model conﬁrms the
conclusions of Ulph (1992) that investment is lower when both countries use
ceilings. Furthermore, the situation in which both countries choose ceilings
is also with Feenstra et al. (1996) a Nash equilibrium.
A further development is given in Feenstra (1998b) where both invest-
ments and level of the polluting input are determined by feedback strategies.
Now it is not always true that investment is larger under taxes than under
ceilings. In the feedback model the substitutability of production factors is
important: if the substitution eﬀects are large enough, investment is larger
under ceilings than under taxes, and hence governments will prefer taxes.
Both Feenstra et al. (1996) and Feenstra (1998b) assume that the prod-
uct is not consumed in the countries where it is produced. As with Ulph
(1992), the results of both models will hold as long as consumption in the
two countries only represents a small part of world consumption. However,
if consumption is large, governments might reverse their preferences.
None of the papers described above include relative standards or credit
trading in their analysis. Relative standards are analyzed by Helfand (1991)
and Ebert (1998), who show that they lead to higher output levels than
emission ceilings. Dijkstra (1999) analyzes preference for instrument of en-
vironmental policy at the national level and includes relative standards. He
assumes perfect competition in the goods market and shows that consumers
should prefer relative standards because of the higher output level, but that
ﬁrms will prefer permit trading because they lead to higher proﬁts.
Dijkstra (1998) analyzes a model with perfect competition between ﬁrms
and explicitly includes the consumer surplus. He studies four cases: autarky,
international trade without pollution, international trade and domestic pol-
lution and international trade and global pollution. The model is a one shot
game of instrument choice between governments, where the ﬁrst two cases are
used as benchmarks. Dijkstra ﬁnds that production is too low with emission
taxes when a country imports the polluting good. This result comes about ir-
respective whether pollution is local or transboundary. A second case occurs
only with transboundary pollution. Dijkstra assumes that the foreign coun-
try does not reduce emissions. If the domestic country reduces emissions,
domestic output becomes lower and foreign output increases. The latter
eﬀect is unwanted because foreign output is more polluting than domestic
output. Therefore, it would be better to have both low domestic emissions7
and high domestic output. This can be achieved with relative standards.
The model presented in the following section has much in common with
the model by Brander and Spencer (1985). However, in my model, there
is no possibility for ﬁrms to invest strategically in capital. The competition
between ﬁrms is modelled as a one-shot game. Result in my model are driven
by the diﬀerences in impact on the industry between the instruments. This
is also the major diﬀerence between my analysis and those by Ulph discussed
above. Whereas Ulph (1992) ﬁnds that governments prefer the instrument
that gives rise to least strategic investment in capital and thereby to least
increase in production, I ﬁnd the opposite. The reason for this diﬀerence is
that what matters in the models by Ulph is that governments want domestic
ﬁrms to react at little as possible to foreign changes in output, while I ﬁnd
that governments prefer an increase in domestic output, no matter how the
foreign ﬁrm and government react.
3 The Model
In the model, there are two producers of a homogeneous good each located
in a diﬀerent country. These producers are the sole producers of the good in
the world. Revenues for each producer are represented by Ri(qi,q j), where
qi is the output of ﬁrm i. The revenue function has the following properties:
Ri
i > 0,R i
j < 0,R i
ii <R i
ij < 0. Costs for each producer are represented by
Ci(qi,E i), where Ei is emissions of a pollutant, which is a variable input. It
is assumed that Ci
qi > 0, Ci
Ei < 0a n dCi
qiqi > 0, Ci
EiEi > 0, and Ci
qiEi < 0.
The governments of both countries have committed themselves to a cer-
tain emission level that is lower than the business as usual level. This assump-
tion makes it possible to focus on the choice of policy instrument without
interference from a possible strategic choice of emission level. The choice of
instruments at the national level is limited to relative standards and emis-
sion ceilings because these two instruments can form the basis for emissions
trading. However, as Dijkstra (1999) shows, taxes and tradable permits lead
to the same production level as emission ceilings and the analysis for the
latter is basically the same as for these other instruments. In the model, it is
assumed that the ﬁrms and countries have no market power in the emissions
quota market. The rationale for this is that the international emission quota
market is likely to be large and ﬁrms from several industries will be engaged
in emissions trading. Therefore, it is less likely for a ﬁrm, or industry, to have
market power in the emission quota market than in the product market.
The government essentially has two decisions to make. First, it has to
choose the domestic instrument, and secondly, it has to chooses whether to8
allow international emissions trading or not. However, international emis-
sions trading may inﬂuence the choice of national instrument.
In the following, we will ﬁrst analyze instrument choice by the government
when international emissions trading is not allowed. After that, we discuss
the case where international emissions trading is possible. In both cases, the
analysis takes the form of a two stage model where ﬁrm behavior is analyzed
ﬁrst and government behavior last.
3.1 No International Emissions Trading
We begin by analyzing the case where the two countries do not allow their
ﬁrms to trade emissions internationally. This means that only domestic in-
struments are relevant for the model. Since the ultimate goal of this paper
is to analyze the preference for international emissions trading scheme, only
emission ceilings and relative standards are discussed, since these can form
the basis for emissions trading. In the following, we will ﬁrst analyze the
second stage in which the ﬁrms set their production level. After that, the
choice of instrument by the government is discussed.
3.1.1 Stage Two: Firm Behavior
The government can choose between two instruments of environmental pol-
icy: emission ceilings and relative standards. With emission ceilings, a cap
equal to ¯ Ei is placed on the emissions of the ﬁrm. Under relative standards,
a standard equal to ¯ ei is placed on emissions per unit of output. Total al-
lowed emissions with this instrument are then given by ¯ eiqi, i.e., the relative
standard times output.
In the following, each ﬁrm takes the output of the other ﬁrm as given
when deciding on its own output level. That is, the ﬁrms are engaged in
Cournot competition.




Πi = Ri(qi,q j) − Ci(qi,E i)
s.t. Ei ≤ ¯ Ei
(1)









Here, λi is the shadow price of emissions. The ﬁrst order conditions are the
usual ones, showing that the ﬁrms sets marginal revenue equal to marginal
production costs and equates marginal abatement costs with the shadow
price of emissions. The second order condition for proﬁt maximization with









Equation (2) is a function of both qi and qj. In other words, it gives the
optimal production level for ﬁrm i for every level of production of ﬁrm j.
Hence, equation (2) can be seen as the reaction function of ﬁrm i. The slope
















Hence, the Nash equilibrium will be stable. To determine the eﬀects of
changes in emissions on the reaction function, we diﬀerentiate equation (2)









Hence, an increase in the emission ceiling will lead to an outward shift of the
ﬁrm’s reaction function.
Relative Standards. Under a relative standard, the government sets an emis-
sion ceiling ¯ ei per unit of production. The ﬁrm is then allowed to emit ¯ eiqi in
total. Since the government is perfectly informed, it sets the relative standard
equal to
¯ Ei
qi . The optimization problem of the ﬁrm becomes
max
qi,Ei
Πi = Ri(qi,q j) − Ci(qi,E i)
s.t. Ei ≤ ¯ eiqi
(5)


















Comparing (2) with (6), it is clear that (6) contains the additional term
Ci
Ei¯ ei. This term is negative, implying that under relative standards P<C i
qi
and that production is larger under relative standards than under emission
ceilings (see also Helfand (1991), Ebert (1998) and Dijkstra (1999)). The ad-
ditional term can be seen as an output subsidy. With relative standards, ﬁrms
are rewarded for additional output by additional allowed emissions. Although
marginal production costs are lower under relative standards, marginal abate-
ment costs are higher. Another interpretation of the diﬀerence between rel-
ative standards and emission ceilings is then that under relative standards
the ﬁrm is deprived of an eﬃcient method to reduce emissions, namely by
reducing output. Under relative standards, the ﬁrm must reduce emissions
per unit of output and not emissions per se. Although reducing output may
lead to some reduction of emissions per unit of output, marginal abatement
costs and output will be higher as a result of the reduction in abatement
possibilities.










Eiqi¯ ei < 0
Again, by implicit diﬀerentiation of ﬁrst order condition (6) the slope of
















Which shows that the Nash equilibrium will be stable. A comparison of (3)























where the superscripts rs and ec stand for relative standards and emission
ceilings respectively. This result arises because Ci
qiEi¯ ei < 0. Hence, a ﬁrm
regulated through relative standards is more responsive to a change in output
by the foreign ﬁrm than a ﬁrm regulated through emission ceilings.11
To determine the eﬀects of changes in emissions on the reaction function,







∂¯ ei +¯ eiCi
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The sign of this equation is not immediately clear. The denominator is
negative from the second order condition, as are the ﬁrst and third term in the
nominator. However, the second term in the nominator is positive. Suppose
that the nominator is positive, giving dqi/d¯ ei < 0. This implies that a stricter
relative standard leads to larger output. This may be conceivable for some
ranges of output where production is ineﬃcient. However, this cannot hold
at all production levels, since when ¯ ei goes to zero, production must go to
zero too. Hence, in the following we assume that dqi/d¯ ei > 0 for all relevant
levels of production. This implies that −Ci
qiEi
∂Ei
∂¯ ei − Ci
Ei
∂Ei
∂¯ ei > ¯ eiCi
EiEi
∂Ei
∂¯ ei ,s o
that production increases as the relative standard is set higher.
3.1.2 Stage One: Government Choice of Instrument
The objective of the government is to maximize domestic welfare. We will
analyze government behavior in two steps. First we assume that the country
under analysis does not consume the good, but exports total production.
Later on we will relax this assumption and allow for domestic consumption
of the good. In both cases, it is assumed that both countries have committed
to reducing emissions by a certain amount.
Without domestic consumption, welfare of the home country is given by
W
h(qh,q f)=R
h(qh,q f) − C
h(qh,E h)
where h stands for home country and f for the foreign country. The gov-
ernment realizes that as it changes the output of the domestic ﬁrm through
its environmental policy, the foreign ﬁrm will react by an opposite change in
production. This implies that qf = qf(qh), with dqf/dqh given by (3) when
















when the foreign country uses relative standards. The latter is diﬀerent
from the reaction function of the ﬁrm since the government knows that the
relative standard will change as qi changes, while the ﬁrm assumes that ¯ ei is12
constant. For ﬁrms, we assumed that |dqi/dqj|
rs > |dqi/dqj|
ec. For this to









which we assume is the case in the remainder of the paper. Using this, the












qh =0 ( 9 )
The ﬁrst term gives the direct eﬀect of a change in domestic output on
domestic revenue, which is positive. The second term gives the change in
revenue as a result of the change in foreign output, which is positive and
the third term gives the change in costs resulting from the change in output,
which again is positive.
To determine which instrument will lead to the highest level of welfare,
we compare the ﬁrst order condition for welfare maximization with the ﬁrst
order conditions for proﬁt maximization for the ﬁrm under the two instru-
ments. Comparing (2) with (9) shows that for welfare maximization, output
should be higher than the output level attained with an emission ceiling.
More precisely, the government is trying to move the domestic ﬁrm to the
Stackelberg leader position. This can be conﬁrmed by assuming that the
domestic ﬁrm is the Stackelberg leader and then ﬁnding the ﬁrst order con-
dition for proﬁt maximization, which is identical to (9). It is clear that (9)
determines a point of highest welfare for country h given the instrument
choice and the behavior of the foreign country. Lower and higher domestic
production levels will give lower welfare.
The question now is, whether a switch to relative standards will lead to
higher welfare. This clearly depends on how large an increase in production
this change of instrument will give. It also depends on the instrument choice
of the foreign country, as can be seen from (9), since since dqf/dqh is larger in
absolute terms under relative standards than under emission ceilings for the
same level of qi. This implies that when the foreign country chooses relative
standards, the home country will want to increase production more than
when the foreign country chooses emission ceilings. The intuition for this is
that proﬁts for the ﬁrm and thereby welfare is higher with lower total levels
of output. Hence, when the foreign country uses emission ceilings, it will not
reduce its output as much as with relative standards when the home country
increases production. With a certain increase in domestic production, world
production will increase more when the foreign country uses emission ceilings13
than relative standards. However, this needs not hold in general because qi
will be diﬀerent for diﬀerent foreign instrument.
The main result so far is that the country would like to increase produc-
tion relative to the level realized with emission ceilings, preferably to the
level where the domestic ﬁrm is the Stackelberg leader. Relative standards
do give a higher production level, but it is uncertain whether they lead to a
too high production level. Hence, the country will most likely prefer to use
relative standards in this case, unless they increase production by too much.
It is important to note that no matter what instrument the foreign coun-
try uses, the domestic country prefers a production level that is higher than
the one reached though an emission ceiling. Note also that the strategies
of the countries actually leads them away from the joint welfare maximizing











Comparing this result to the ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt proﬁt maxi-
mization with the two instruments shows that the joint optimum production
levels in each country are reached at a lower level than the one reached with
Cournot competition and emission ceilings. It is clear that the countries are
caught in a classical Prisoner’s dilemma; both countries want to increase the
production of their own ﬁrm to capture market share from the foreign ﬁrm.
By doing so, they increase total world production. However, both countries
would be better of if they could agree on a lower production level.
We now turn to the more general case where the country both produces





P(y)dy − P(y)µhy + R
h(qh,q f) − C(qh,E h)
where µh is the proportion of identical consumers living in country h.T h e
ﬁrst two terms in the welfare equation give the consumers’ surplus, while





















The last term gives the total eﬀect of an increase in domestic production
on the consumers’ surplus. This term is negative, and hence indicates that
production should be higher when there is domestic consumption than when14
there is no domestic consumption. In other words, with domestic consump-
tion, the country wants to increase production beyond the point of the Stack-
elberg leader level. But by how much does the country want to increase
production?
To ﬁnd an answer, rewrite revenue for a ﬁrm as Ri(qh,q f)=P(qh,q f)qi.













(qh − µhy) = 0 (10)
The ﬁrst term is the ﬁrst order condition for welfare optimization if the ﬁrm
and the country have no inﬂuence on the product price (P (y) = 0) or in the
case of autarky (qh = µhy). In those cases, the country will prefer the output
level reached by perfect competition in the market. The second term gives
the eﬀect of a change in production on revenue times the trade balance in the
product. Hence, to determine the optimal production level, it is important
to know whether the country imports or exports the product.
When the country imports the product, qh <µ hy,a n dt h el a s tt e r mi n
(10) becomes positive. To optimize welfare, the country should increase pro-
duction beyond the perfect competitive level. When the country exports the
product, qh >µ hy, and the country should have a lower production level
than the one realized with perfect competition. Hence, when the country
consumes the good, the optimum production level is higher than the Stack-
elberg leader production level. Depending on whether the country imports
or exports the good, optimum production is higher or lower than the full
competitive output level respectively. With domestic consumption it is then
even more likely that the country will prefer relative standards over emission
ceilings and more so when it imports the good than when it exports the good.
3.2 Private International Emissions Trading
We now turn to the case where the domestic ﬁrm is allowed to trade emissions
on the international emission quota market. Again, we will ﬁrst analyze
ﬁrm behavior and thereafter government choice of instrument. We will also
determine whether allowing international emissions trading leads to higher
or lower welfare for the country.
3.2.1 Stage Two: Firm Behavior
In this part, the behavior of the ﬁrms is analyzed when international emis-
sions trading is allowed. There are basically two forms of emissions trading,
each based on one of the instruments discussed above. Emissions trading15
based on emissions ceilings will be denoted as permit trading, while emis-
sions trading based on relative standards will be denoted as credit trading.
In the following, it is assumed that there is an international emissions trad-
ing market on which neither the ﬁrms, nor their governments have market
power. This implies that ﬁrms and governments take the emission quota
price as given.
Permit Trading Taking the initial distribution of permits, ¯ Ei and the price




i(qi,q j) − C
i(qi,E i) − T(Ei − ¯ Ei) (11)









The ﬁrst order conditions are basically the same as those for an emission
ceiling, with T replacing λi. As a result, slope of the reaction function for
permit trading is given by (3). The eﬀect of a change in the price of permits











This says that production will go down as the price of permits goes up. An
increase in the permit price than leads to an inward shift of the reaction func-
tion. An increase in the permit price works as a tightening of environmental
policy, which is why we arrive at the result above.
Credit Trading. With credit trading, ﬁrms are regulated through relative
standards, and are then allowed to sell credits if they can stay below the




i(qi,q j) − C
i(qi,E i) − T(Ei − ¯ eiqi)
The ﬁrst order conditions are
R
i














This is identical to (6), the same condition for relative standards. This
implies that the slope of the reaction function is given by (7). The eﬀect of




















An increase in the price of permits is equivalent to a tightening of environ-











3.2.2 Stage One: Government Policy
With international emissions trading, the government has two choices to
make. First of all, which domestic instrument to choose and secondly, whether
or not to allow international emissions trading. In this section, these issues
are dealt with.
We start by analyzing the eﬀect of a shift to international emissions trad-
ing on proﬁts of the ﬁrm. This eﬀect is diﬀerent for the two instruments. For
a shift from emission ceilings to permit trading, it can be found by diﬀeren-




























− (Ei − ¯ Ei)











− (Ei − ¯ Ei) (15)
The ﬁrst term gives the change in revenue because of a change in foreign
production. This change is caused by the change in domestic production
from a shift to international emissions trading. So this eﬀect only reﬂects
the shift to international emissions trading by the home country, while the
foreign country is assumed not to change its policy, with foreign policy either
being domestic regulation or international emissions trading. This ﬁrst term
has a negative sign. The second term reﬂects the proceeds from emissions
trading.
Assume at ﬁrst that the world price of permits is higher than the domestic
shadow price of abatement, T>λ i, and the domestic ﬁrm becomes a seller17
of permits. Then from (15), the ﬁrst term is negative and the second term is
negative. Proﬁts decrease because domestic production is lower and foreign
production is higher. On the other hand, the ﬁrm receives a proﬁt from
emissions trading. The overall eﬀect is uncertain and depends on the size of
the two eﬀects.
In the next case, the world price of permits is lower than the domestic
shadow price, T<λ i, which makes the domestic ﬁrm a buyer of permits.
The ﬁrst term in (15) is negative and the second term now is positive because
Ei > ¯ Ei. Both eﬀects point to higher proﬁts. The domestic ﬁrm increases
production, while the foreign ﬁrm decreases production. At the same time,
proﬁts increase because the cost of using emissions has decreased.
The above shows that a shift from emission ceilings to international emis-
sions trading always leads to an increase in proﬁts when the country becomes
a buyer of emission quotas. Domestic production is increased and foreign
production decreased leading to higher domestic revenues, while at the same
time there is a proﬁt from the trade in emission quotas. If the country be-
comes a seller of permits, the shift to international emissions trading only
leads to higher proﬁts if the proceeds from emissions trading outweigh the
reduction in revenue because of a reduction in production.
When the country uses relative standards, the eﬀect of allowing interna-
tional emissions trading can be found by diﬀerentiation of equation (5) with
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The ﬁrst term gives the change in domestic revenue because of the change in
foreign production which is negative. The second term gives the emissions
trade volume, the sign of which depends on whether the country becomes a
seller or buyer of credits. The third term gives the value of the change in the
relative standard. This last term arises because the government will react to a
change in production with a change in the relative standard since the latter is
deﬁned as allowed total emissions divided by total production. If production
rises because of a lower world price of credits, then the relative standard18
must be set lower and reverse for the case where production decreases. This
implies that d¯ e/dλi > 0 and hence that the third term is positive.
First consider the case where the world price of emission quotas is higher
than the domestic shadow price, T>λ i. In this case, the domestic ﬁrm
becomes a seller of credits. As mentioned above, the ﬁrst term has a nega-
tive sign, while the third term has a positive sign. Proﬁts decrease because
domestic production is lower and foreign production is higher, while proﬁts
increase because allowed emissions per unit of production increase. Since the
ﬁrm becomes a seller, Ei < ¯ eiqi and the second term is negative. So, proﬁts
increase because the ﬁrm makes a proﬁt on the sale of credits. This leaves us
with two positive eﬀects on proﬁt and one negative. Hence, the total eﬀect of
allowing international emissions trading on proﬁts is uncertain and depends
on the size of the three eﬀects.
In the second case, the world price of emission quotas is lower than the
domestic shadow price of emissions, T<λ i, and the domestic ﬁrm becomes
a buyer of emission quotas. The ﬁrst term in (16) is negative, while the
third term is positive. Now the domestic ﬁrm increases production while the
foreign ﬁrm decreases production which leads to an increase in proﬁts for the
domestic ﬁrm. At the same time, the relative standard is tightened, so that
allowed emission per unit of production decrease, which lowers proﬁts. At
the same time, the domestic ﬁrm now becomes a buyer of permits, Ei > ¯ eiqi
and the second term becomes positive. This means that proﬁts increase
because the ﬁrm can save on abatement costs. We are again left with two
factors that have a positive eﬀect on proﬁts, while there is one factor with a
negative eﬀect on proﬁts. The overall result depends on the size of the three
eﬀects. However, it is unlikely that the change in relative standards outweighs
the direct gains from emissions trading. Hence, the shift to international
emissions trading will lead to an increase in proﬁts in this case.
Welfare of the country, with domestic consumption and international
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This is identical to the ﬁrst order condition for welfare maximization without
international emissions trading. The implication is that the optimization
problem of the government is basically the same in the two cases. However,19
there is a diﬀerence in that international emissions trading changes the price
of emissions an thereby the actual emission level of the country. This in turn
will aﬀect welfare, and the eﬀect may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent instruments.
To analyze the change in welfare as a result from the shift to international
























The ﬁrst term gives the diﬀerence between marginal revenue and marginal
cost. The sign of this term depends on whether the country uses credit or
permit trading. In the ﬁrst case Rh
qh <C h
qh and the term becomes positive,
while with permit trading the term vanishes as can be seen from the ﬁrst order
conditions for proﬁt maximization. The second term reﬂects the reaction
by the foreign country to a domestic change in production. This term is
negative. The third term reﬂects the volume of trade and is negative when
the country exports emission quotas and positive when it imports them. The
fourth term gives the overall change in price times the amount consumed in
the home country and is thereby an indicator of consumer welfare.
In the following we will analyze for both instruments separately whether
a shift to international emissions trading leads to an increase in welfare or
not. With both instruments, there are two cases to consider since the country
can become an importer or an exporter of emission quotas.
Permit Trading. With permit trading, the ﬁrst term in (18) vanishes since
Rh
qh = Ch
qh from the ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization. This
leaves three factors that aﬀect welfare when the country allows international
emissions trading. Suppose at ﬁrst that the world price of emission quotas is
higher than the domestic shadow price, i.e., T>λ h. This leads to decrease
in domestic production, an increase in foreign production and a decrease in
world production and consequently to a higher world price of the product.
The second term in (18) becomes negative because foreign production is
higher. Also the fourth term points to a decrease in welfare because the
higher world price of the product decreases consumers’ welfare. The third
term however shows that there is a welfare increase from emissions trading.
As we saw above, permit trading leads to a too low production level. If
T>λ h, then production will decrease even more if international emissions
trading is allowed. Hence, only when the gain from emissions trading is
substantial enough will the shift to emissions trading lead to an increase in
welfare in this case.20
In the second case, T<λ h and the country becomes an importer of emis-
sion quotas. This leads to an increase in domestic production, a decrease in
foreign production and an increase in overall production and consequently
to a decrease in the world price of the product. In this case, all three re-
maining terms in (18) point to an increase in welfare. The second term is
negative, showing that domestic welfare increases because the domestic ﬁrm
gains market share and increases revenue. Also in this case, the country gains
from emissions trading, now from a lower price of emissions. Finally, total
production increases which gives a lower world price of the good, increasing
consumers’ welfare. This outcome is not very surprising since it has been
shown above that output is too small with permit trading. Opening up for
international emissions trading when the world permit price is lower than
the domestic shadow price then leads to more production. Additionally, the
country gains from emissions trading.
Credit Trading. With credit trading, the ﬁrst term in (18) becomes posi-
tive, showing that there is a production distortion compared to the case with
permit trading. We start the analysis with the case where, T>λ h and the
country becomes an exporter of credits. That is, real emissions will be lower
than the emission ceiling set by the government. The result is that domestic
production decreases, foreign production increases, while total production
decreases and the world price of the product increases. It follows from (18)
that the total eﬀect on welfare from a shift to international emissions trading
is uncertain. The ﬁrst term shows an increase in welfare since the produc-
tion distortion becomes less important because of lower domestic production.
However, the second term points to lower welfare since the foreign ﬁrm wins
market share over the domestic ﬁrm. The third term gives the proceeds from
emissions trading and shows that the country gains from trading. However,
the last term again points to a decrease in welfare since consumers are con-
fronted with higher overall prices. The overall eﬀect depends on the relative
size of the four factors here. For example if domestic consumption is very
small or nonexistent, the main issue is wether the proﬁts from emissions
trading are higher than the losses because of the lower market share of the
domestic ﬁrm.
When T<λ h, the country becomes an importer of emission quotas and
domestic emissions will be higher than the emission ceiling set by the gov-
ernment. This results in an increase in domestic production and a decrease
in foreign production, however, total world production will increase and the
world price of the product will decrease. Three factors now point to an in-
crease in welfare, while one points to a decrease. The decrease in welfare
comes from a larger distortion of production compared to the optimal as21
shown by the ﬁrst term in (18). However, foreign production is decreased,
the country has lower costs from emissions and consumers gain from lower
world prices. Hence, as long as the eﬀect of the production distortion is not
too large, allowing international emissions trading leads to an increase in
welfare in this case.
The main eﬀects from a shift to international emissions trading are that
the country makes a proﬁt on emissions trading and that production is af-
fected. The ﬁrst eﬀect is always positive. Either the country makes a proﬁt
on the sale of emission quotas, or the country gains from lower costs of emis-
sions. The second term can be both positive or negative. When the world
price of emission quotas is higher than the domestic shadow price of emis-
sions, production will decrease when the ﬁrm engages in emissions trading.
As we saw in the part on domestic instruments, emission ceilings, and thereby
permit trading, leads to too low production in the ﬁrst place. A further re-
duction in production then leads to lower welfare. For credit trading, the
eﬀect is more complicated. Relative standards lead to a higher level of pro-
duction than emission ceilings. However, production may also become too
high. If production is lower than optimal with relative standards, allowing
international emissions trading may lead to lower welfare when the country
becomes a seller of credits. However, if relative standards lead to too much
production, emissions trading with a higher world price than the domestic
shadow price of emissions may lead to higher welfare.
With the world price of emission quotas lower than the domestic shadow
price of emissions, production is increased. This leads to an increase in
welfare, unless it leads to too much production. When the country uses
relative standards, domestic production may be too high beforehand. The
shift to emissions trading then gives even higher production and leads to
lower welfare. An important determinant for how high domestic production
should be is the proportion of world consumers in the home country. The
higher this proportion, the higher domestic production must be.
The result is that allowing international emissions trading will not always
lead to an increase in welfare. This is especially the case when the shift to
international emissions trading leads to a decrease in domestic production.
This leads both to lower domestic proﬁts and lower welfare for consumers.
Only if the direct gain from emissions trading is large enough can there be
an increase in welfare. When international emissions trading leads to an
increase in production, welfare is very likely to increase, both with permit
and credit trading.
For government preference of instrument we then ﬁnd the following. When
T>λ h, the country will presumably prefer domestic relative standards or22
credit trading. These instruments lead to higher production than emission
ceilings and permit trading. Credit trading will only be preferred to relative
standards in this case when the gain from emissions trading is large enough
to oﬀset the loss from lower domestic production, or when relative standards
lead to too much output. When T<λ h the country will prefer international
emissions trading. Whether permit or credit trading leads to highest welfare
depends on how large production is under relative standards and how much
the shift to international emissions trading leads to an increase in production.
If both eﬀects are not large, then the government will prefer credit trading
in this case.
4 Conclusions
In this paper I have presented a model of duopolistic international trade with
the two competitors situated in diﬀerent countries. Within this setting, I have
analyzed government preferences for instrument of environmental policy and
for international emissions trading scheme.
The analysis leads to two main conclusions. With imperfect competi-
tion, governments have an incentive to increase production, which is even
strengthened when there is domestic consumption. This leads to a prefer-
ence for relative standards or credit trading since these instruments lead to
a higher output level of the domestic ﬁrm than other instruments do. Firms
engaged in oligopolistic competition can increase proﬁts if they could commit
to a higher output level. Such a commitment is however not credible if it
is made by the ﬁrm, but it is credible if made by the domestic government.
Since the two countries are in the same situation, both will use relative stan-
dards to increase output. This leads to higher world output and lower ﬁrm
proﬁts. Welfare may increase though if there is domestic consumption.
The second main result is that international emissions trading is not al-
ways welfare improving. This is especially the case when the country becomes
a seller of emission quotas. In this case, domestic and world output will de-
crease and the world price of the product will increase. This leads to lower
ﬁrm proﬁts and lower consumers’ surplus. Although emissions trading per se
leads to an increase in proﬁts for the ﬁrm, the other eﬀects can be so large
as to outweigh this direct proﬁt from emissions trading.
A possible extension of the model would be to introduce capital as an
additional input in which ﬁrms can invest strategically. That would combine
the current model with those developed by Ulph as discussed in Section
2. Since his results run counter to mine, a combination might be able to
determine which eﬀect is stronger.23
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